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Abstract

Despite signiﬁcant developments in proof theory, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to
the concept of proof veriﬁers. In particular, the mathematical community may be interested in
studying different types of proof veriﬁers (people, programs, oracles, communities,
superintelligences) as mathematical objects. Such an effort could reveal their properties, their
powers and limitations (particularly in human mathematicians), minimum and maximum
complexity, as well as self-veriﬁcation and self-reference issues. We propose an initial
classiﬁcation system for veriﬁers and provide some rudimentary analysis of solved and open
problems in this important domain. Our main contribution is a formal introduction of the notion
of unveriﬁability, for which the paper could serve as a general citation in domains of theorem
proving, as well as software and AI veriﬁcation.
Keywords: veriﬁer theory, proof theory, observer, veriﬁed veriﬁer, veriﬁability
1. On observers and veriﬁers

veriﬁer in the context of mathematics is an agent capable of
checking a given proof, step-by-step, starting from axioms to
make sure that all intermediate deductions are indeed warranted, that the ﬁnal conclusion follows, and consequently,
that the claimed theorem is indeed true. In this work we
present an overview of different types of veriﬁers currently
relied on by the mathematical community, as well as a few
novel types of veriﬁers which we suggest be added to the
repertoire of mathematicians at least as theoretical tools of
veriﬁer theory. Our general analysis should be equally
applicable to different types of proofs (induction, contradiction, exhaustion, enumeration, reﬁnement, nonconstructive, probabilistic, holographic, experiment, picture,
etc) and to computer software.

The concept of an ‘observer’ shows up in contexts as diverse
as physics (particularly quantum and relativity), biophysics,
neuroscience, cognitive science, artiﬁcial intelligence (AI),
philosophy of consciousness, and cosmology [1], but what is
an equivalent idea in mathematics? We believe it is the notion
of the proof veriﬁer. Consequently, the majority of open
questions recently raised [1] by the Foundational Questions
Institute related to the physics of the observer could be asked
about proof veriﬁers. In particular, the mathematical community may be interested in studying different types of proof
veriﬁers (people, programs, oracles, communities, superintelligences, etc) as mathematical objects, ways they can be
formalized, their power and limitations (particularly in human
mathematicians), minimum and maximum complexity, as
well as self-veriﬁcation and self-reference in veriﬁers.
Proof theory has been developed to study proofs as formal mathematical objects consisting of axioms from which,
by rules of inference, one can arrive at theorems [2]. However, the indispensable concept of the veriﬁer has been conspicuously absent from the discussion, particularly with
regards to its formalization and practical manifestation. A
0031-8949/17/093001+08$33.00

2. Historical perspective
The ﬁeld of mathematics progresses by proving theorems,
which in turn serve as building blocks for future proofs of yet
more interesting and useful theorems. To avoid introduction
of costly errors in the form of incorrect theorems, proofs
typically undergo an examination process, usually as a part of
1
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a peer-review. Traditionally, human mathematicians have
been employed as proof veriﬁers; however, history is full of
examples of undetected errors and important omissions even
in the most widely examined proofs [3–7]. It has been estimated that at least a third of all mathematical publications
contain errors [8]. To avoid errors and make the job of human
veriﬁers as easy as possible ‘a single step in a deduction has
been required K [t]o be simple enough, broadly speaking, to
be apprehended as correct by a human being in a single
intellectual act. No doubt this custom originated in the desire
that each single step of a deduction should be indubitable,
even though the deduction as a whole may consist of a long
chain of such steps’ [9].
Despite such stringent requirements, it has long been
realized that a single human veriﬁer is not reliable enough to
ascertain validity of a proof with a sufﬁcient degree of
reliability. In fact, it is known that humans are subject to
hundreds of well-known ‘bugs’1, and probably many more
unknown ones. To reduce the number of potential mistakes
and to increase our conﬁdence in the validity of a proof, a
number of independent human mathematicians should
examine an important mathematical claim. As Calude puts it,
‘A theorem is a statement which could be checked individually by a mathematician and conﬁrmed also individually by
at least two or three other mathematicians, each of them
working independently. But already we can observe the
weakness of the criterion: how many mathematicians are to
check individually and independently the status of [a conjecture] to give it a status of a theorem?’ [4].
Clearly, the greater the number of independent veriﬁers,
the higher is our conﬁdence in the validity of a theorem. We
can say that ‘a theorem is validated if it has been accepted by
a general agreement of the mathematical community’ [4].
Krantz agrees and says: ‘it is the mathematics profession,
taken as a whole, that decides what is correct and valid, and
also what is useful and is interesting and has value’ [10].
Wittgenstein expresses similar views, as quoted in [11]: ‘who
validates the ‘mathematical knowledge’? K the acceptability
ultimately comes from the collective opinion of the social
group of people practising mathematics.’ So, for many practitioners of mathematics, proof veriﬁcation is a social and
democratic process in which ‘[a]fter enough internalization,
enough transformation, enough generalization, enough use,
and enough connection, the mathematical community eventually decides that the central concepts in the original theorem, now perhaps greatly changed, have an ultimate stability.
If the various proofs feel right and the results are examined
from enough angles, then the truth of the theorem is eventually considered to be established’ [12].
While the mathematical community as a whole constitutes a powerful proof veriﬁer, a desire for ever greater
accuracy has led researchers to develop mechanized veriﬁcation systems capable of handling formal proofs of great
length. The prototype for such veriﬁers has its roots in formal
systems [13] proposed by David Hilbert and which ‘contain
an algorithm that mechanically checks the validity of all
1

proofs that can be formulated in the system. The formal
system consists of an alphabet of symbols in which all
statements can be written; a grammar that speciﬁes how the
symbols are to be combined; a set of axioms, or principles
accepted without proof; and rules of inference for deriving
theorems from the axioms’ [14]. However, there is a tradeoff
when one switches from using human veriﬁers to utilizing
automated ones, namely: ‘People are usually not very good in
checking formal correctness of proofs, but they are quite good
at detecting potential weaknesses or ﬂaws in proofs’ [15].
‘Artiﬁcial’ mathematicians are far less ingenious and subtle
than human mathematicians, but they surpass their human
counterparts by being inﬁnitely more patient and diligent’ [4].
In other words, while automated veriﬁers are excellent at
spotting incorrect deductions, they are much worse than
humans at seeing the ‘big picture’ outlined in the proof.
Additionally, to maintain a consistent standard of veriﬁcation for all accepted theorems, a signiﬁcant effort would
need to be applied to reexamine already-accepted proofs. ‘to
do so would certainly entail going back and rewriting from
scratch all old mathematical papers whose results we depend
on. It is also quite hard to come up with good technical
choices for formal deﬁnitions that will be valid in the variety
of ways that mathematicians want to use them and that will
anticipate future extensions of mathematics. K [M]uch of our
time would be spent with international standards commissions
to establish uniform deﬁnitions and resolve huge controversies’ [15].
Such criticism of automated veriﬁers is not new and has
been expressed in the past, particularly from a human centric
point of view: ‘No matter how precise the rules (logical and
physical) are, we need human consciousness to apply the
rules and to understand them and their consequences.
Mathematics is a human activity’ [4]. Additionally, ‘[m]
echanical proof-checkers have indeed been developed, though
their use is currently limited by the need or the proof to be
written in precisely the right logical formalism’ [16].
Despite such criticism, there is also a lot of hope in terms
of what automated veriﬁcation can offer mathematics. ‘[M]
athematical knowledge is far too vast to be understood by one
person, moreover, it has been estimated that the total amount
of published mathematics doubles every ten to ﬁfteen yearsK
Perhaps computers can also help us to navigate, abstract and,
hence, understand K proofs. Realizing this dream of:
computer access to a world repository of mathematical
knowledge; visualizing and understanding this knowledge;
reusing and combining it to discover new knowledge’ [17].

3. Classiﬁcation of veriﬁers
A certain connection exists between the concept of observer
in physics and a veriﬁer in mathematics/science. Both must
be instantiated in the physical world as either hardware or
software to perform its function, but other than that, we
currently have a very limited understanding of types and
properties associated with such agents. As the ﬁrst step, we
propose a simple classiﬁcation system for veriﬁers, sorting

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases.
2
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them with respect to domain of application, type of implementation, and general properties. With respect to their
domain, we see veriﬁers as necessary for checking mathematical proofs, scientiﬁc theories, software correctness,
intelligent behavior safety, and consistency and properties of
algorithms. Some examples:
• Software veriﬁer—evaluates correctness of a program.
Via the Curry–Harvard correspondence [18], proof
veriﬁcation and program veriﬁcation are equivalent and
software veriﬁcation is a special case of theorem
veriﬁcation restricted to computational logic [19]. A
compiler or interpreter can be seen as a program syntax
veriﬁer among other things.
• AI-veriﬁer—is a particular type of software veriﬁer
capable of verifying the behavior of intelligent systems
in novel environments unknown at the time of design
[20, 21]. Yampolskiy presents veriﬁcation of selfimproving software [22, 23] as a particular challenge to
the AI community: ‘Ideally every generation of selfimproving system should be able to produce a veriﬁable
proof of its safety for external examination’ [24].
Consequently, research linking functional speciﬁcation
to physical states is of great interest. ‘This type of theory
would allow use of formal tools to anticipate and control
behaviors of systems that approximate rational agents,
alternate designs such as satisﬁcing agents, and systems
that cannot be easily described in the standard agent
formalism (powerful prediction systems, theorem-provers, limited-purpose science or engineering systems,
etc). It may also be that such a theory could allow
rigorously demonstrating that systems are constrained
from taking certain kinds of actions or performing certain
kinds of reasoning’ [20].
• Scientiﬁc theory veriﬁer—examines the output of computer simulations of scientiﬁc theories. A scientiﬁc theory
cannot be considered fully accepted until it can be
expressed as an algorithm and simulated on a computer. It
should produce observations consistent with measurements obtained in the real world, perhaps adjusting for the
relativity of time scale between simulation and the real
world. In other words, an unsimulatable hypothesis
should be considered signiﬁcantly weaker than a
simulatable one. It is possible that the theory cannot be
simulated due to limits in our current computational
capacity, hardware design, or capability of programmers
and that it will become simulatable in the future, but until
such time, it should have a tentative status. A scientiﬁc
theory veriﬁer could be seen as a formalized equivalent of
a peer-reviewer in science.
• NP solution veriﬁer—is an algorithm which can quickly
(in polynomial time) check a certiﬁcate (also called
witness) representing a solution, which can then be used
to determine if a computation produces a ‘yes’ or ‘no’
answer. In fact, one of the requirements of NPcompleteness states that a problem is in that class if
there exists a veriﬁer for the problem. An NP-
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completeness veriﬁer would check a reduction of a novel
problem to an already known problem in the NP class to
determine if it is of equal or lesser complexity.
Analogously, we can postulate an AI-completeness
veriﬁer capable of checking if a problem is reducible to
an instance of the turing test [25–27].
With respect to type, veriﬁers could be people (or
groups of people), software, hypothetical agents such as
oracles, or artiﬁcial (super)intelligent entities. For
example:
Human mathematician—historically the default veriﬁer
for most mathematical proofs. Individual mathematicians
have been recruited to examine mathematical reasoning
since the inception of the ﬁeld. Recent developments in
computer-generated proofs appear to be beyond the
capacity of human veriﬁers due to the size of such proofs.
Mathematical community—a collective of mathematicians taken as a whole used to examine and evaluate
claimed proofs, while at the same time removing any
outlier opinions of individual mathematicians. It is well
known that the wisdom of crowds can outperform
individual experts [28, 29].
Mechanical veriﬁer (automated proof checker)—automated software and hardware veriﬁers such as computer
programs have been developed to assist in veriﬁcation of
formal proofs [30]. ‘The proof checker veriﬁes that each
inference step in the proof is a valid instance of one of the
axioms and inference rules speciﬁed as part of the safety
policy’ [31]. They are believed to be more accurate than
human mathematicians and are capable of verifying much
longer proofs, which may not be surveyable [32–35] or
too complex (not comprehensible [36]) for human
mathematicians.
Hybrid veriﬁer—a combination of other types of veriﬁers,
most typically a human mathematician assisted by a
mechanical veriﬁer.
Oracle veriﬁer—a veriﬁer with access to an oracle turing
machine. Particular types would include a halting veriﬁer
(a hypothetical veriﬁer not subject to the halting
problem), a Gödel veriﬁer (not subject to incompleteness
limits), and an undecidable proof veriﬁer. All such
veriﬁcation would be done in constant time.
(Super)intelligent veriﬁer—a veriﬁer capable of checking
all decidable proofs, particularly those constructed by
superintelligent AI.
Some veriﬁers also have non-trivial mathematical
properties, which include: ability to self-verify, probabilistic proof checking, relative correctness, designated
nature, meta-veriﬁcation capacity, honest or dishonest
behavior, and axiomatic acceptance. For example:
Axiomatically correct veriﬁer—a type of authority based
veriﬁer, which decides the truth of a theorem without a
need to disclose its process. This is a veriﬁer whose
correctness is accepted without justiﬁcation, much like an
axiom is accepted by the math community.
Designated veriﬁer—for some proofs of knowledge it is
important that only the veriﬁer nominated by the
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mistake (agents are fallible)? Obviously, another agent has to
check that the agent doing the checking did not make any
mistakes. Some other agent will need to check that agent and
so on. Eventually one runs out of agents who could check the
proof and, in principle, they could all have made a mistake!’
[56]. Later, Calude and Muller emphasize: ‘one cannot prove
the correctness of the formal prover itself’ [57]. Similarly,
MacKenzie observes: ‘Indeed, if one was to apply the formal,
mechanical notion of proof entirely stringently, might not the
software of the automated theorem prover itself have to be
veriﬁed formally? K The formal, mechanized notion of proof
thus prompted a modern day version of Juvenal’s ancient
question, quis custodiet ipsos custodes, who will guard the
guards themselves?’ [58]. Others have expressed similar
sentiments [11].
Our trust in a formal proof is only as strong as our trust in
the veriﬁer used to check the proof; as the veriﬁer itself needs
to be veriﬁed, and so on ad inﬁnitum, we are never given a
100% guarantee of correctness, only asymptotically increasing probability of correctness. Worse yet, at the end of the
chain of veriﬁers there is typically a single human, whose
internal mechanism is simply not veriﬁable with our current
technology and possibly not veriﬁable in principle. Additionally, problems other than inﬁnite regress of veriﬁers may
signiﬁcantly reduce our ability to verify proofs. Such obstacles include: splicing and skipping [59], hidden lemmas [60],
exponential size proofs [61] (with recent publication of a 200
terabyte computer proof [62] being only a current record
which is unlikely to stand for long), impenetrable proofs [63],
hardware failures [64, 65], Rice’s theorem [66], and Gödel’s
Incompleteness theorem [42].
After the advent of probabilistic proofs by Rabin [67],
‘[s]ome have argued that there is no essential difference
between such probabilistic proofs and the deterministic proofs
of standard mathematical practice. Both are convincing
arguments. Both are to be believed with a certain probability
of error. In fact, many deterministic proofs, it is claimed, have
a higher probability of error’ [68]. ‘K the authenticity of a
mathematical proof is not absolute, but only probabilistic. K
Proofs cannot be too long, else their probabilities go down
and they bafﬂe the checking process. To put it in another way:
all really deep theorems are false (or at best unproved or
unprovable). All true theorems are trivial’ [3]. ‘A derivation
of a theorem or a veriﬁcation of a proof has only probabilistic
validity. It makes no difference whether the instrument of
derivation or veriﬁcation is man or a machine. The probabilities may vary, but are roughly of the same order of
magnitude’ [3]. All proofs have a certain level of ‘proofness’
[69], which can be made arbitrarily deep via expending
necessary veriﬁcation resources, but ‘in no domain of
mathematics is the notion of provability a perfect substitute
for the notion of truth [70].’ To conclude, we reiterate
Knuth’s famous warning: ‘Beware of bugs in the above code:
I have only proved it correct, not tried it.’

conﬁrmer can get any conﬁrmation of the correctness of
the proof [37].
Honest (trusted) veriﬁer—‘does not try to extract any
secret from the prover by deviating from the proof
protocol. K untrusted-veriﬁer does not need to assume
that the veriﬁer is honest’ [38].
Probabilistic veriﬁer—a veriﬁer, which by examining an
ever-greater number of parts of a proof, arrives at a
probabilistic measure of the correctness of the theorem.
Such veriﬁers are a part of zero knowledge based
protocols.
Relative veriﬁer—a veriﬁer with respect to which a
particular theorem has been shown to be correct, which
does not guarantee that it would be conﬁrmed by other
veriﬁers.
Gradual veriﬁer—a veriﬁer which determines a percentage of statements that are already guaranteed to be safe
[39], permitting a gradual veriﬁcation process to take
place.
Meta-veriﬁer—a hypothetical veriﬁer capable of checking
correctness of other veriﬁers.
Self-veriﬁer—an agent which is capable of verifying its
own accuracy [40]. A frequently suggested approach to
avoid an inﬁnite regress of veriﬁers, a self-verifying
veriﬁer could contain an error causing it to erroneously
claim its own correctness [41] and is also subject to
limitations imposed by Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem
[42] and other similar self-referential constraints [21].

4. Unveriﬁability
Unveriﬁability, an idea frequently discussed in philosophy
[43–45], has been implicitly present in mathematics since the
early days of the ﬁeld. In this section, we survey literature that
deals with the limits of proof veriﬁability caused by inﬁnite
regress of veriﬁers, and provides analysis of the concept of
unveriﬁability. We believe that such explicit discussion will
be useful to researchers interested in being able to cite this
important idea, which so far has been relegated to the status of
mathematical folklore [46] and only alluded to in the literature, despite being a more general result than incompleteness [42, 47].
Unveriﬁability is a fundamental limitation on veriﬁcation
of mathematical proofs, computer software, behavior of
intelligent agents, and all formal systems. It is an ultimate
limit to our ability to know certain information and is similar
to other major ‘impossibilities’ to acquiring knowledge in our
universe such as: uncertainty [48], randomness [49, 50],
incompleteness [42, 47], undecidability [51], undeﬁnability
[52], unprovability [53], incompressibility [14], noncomputability [54], and relativity [55]. Many paths can lead us to
arrive at the concept of unveriﬁability, but in this paper we
concentrate speciﬁcally on the inﬁnite regress of veriﬁers.
For example, Calude et al state: ‘what if the ‘agent’
human or computer checking a proof for correctness makes a

4
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5. Unveriﬁability of software

conversely, taking meaning as something that can be obtained
only at the expense of rigour’ [56]. With respect to intelligent
agents, we can propose an additional conjugate pair—(capability, control). The more generally intelligent and capable
an entity is, the less likely it is to be predictable, controllable,
or veriﬁable.
It is becoming obvious that just as we can only have
probabilistic conﬁdence in correctness of mathematical proofs
and software implementations, our ability to verify intelligent
agents is at best limited. As Klein puts it: ‘if you really want
to build a system that can have truly unexpected behavior,
then by deﬁnition you cannot verify that it is safe, because
you just don’t know what it will do’3. Muehlhauser writes:
‘The same reasoning applies to [artiﬁcial general intelligence]
AGI ‘friendliness.’ Even if we discover (apparent) solutions
to known open problems in Friendly AI research, this does
not mean that we can ever build an AGI that is ‘provably
friendly’ in the strongest sense, because K we can never be
100% certain that there are no errors in our formal reasoning.
K Thus, the approaches sometimes called ‘provable security,’ ‘provable safety,’ and ‘provable friendliness’ should not
be misunderstood as offering 100% guarantees of security,
safety, and friendliness.’4 Jilk, writing on limits to veriﬁcation
and validation in AI, points out that ‘language of certainty’ is
unwarranted in reference to agentic behavior [79]. He also
states: ‘there cannot be a general automated procedure for
verifying that an agent absolutely conforms to any determinate set of rules of action.’
Seshia et al, describing some of the challenges of creating veriﬁed AI, note: ‘It may be impossible even to precisely
deﬁne the interface between the system and environment (i.e.,
to identify the variables/features of the environment that must
be modeled), let alone to model all possible behaviors of the
environment. Even if the interface is known, non-deterministic or over-approximate modeling is likely to produce too
many spurious bug reports, rendering the veriﬁcation process
useless in practice. K [T]he complexity and heterogeneity of
AI-based systems means that, in general, many decision
problems underlying formal veriﬁcation are likely to be
undecidable. K To overcome this obstacle posed by computational complexity, one must K settle for incomplete or
unsound formal veriﬁcation methods’ [78].
These results are not surprising. AI cannot be veriﬁed
because AI itself can serve as a veriﬁer which we already
showed cannot be veriﬁed because of inﬁnite regress problem
and general unveriﬁability. By spending increasing computational resources, the best we can hope for is an increased
statistical probability that our mathematical proofs, and software/AI are error free, but we should never forget that a
100% accurate veriﬁcation is not possible, even in theory, and
act accordingly. AI, and even more so artiﬁcial superintelligence, is unveriﬁable and so potentially unsafe [80–85].

Unveriﬁability has important consequences not just for
mathematicians and philosophers of knowledge; more
recently it has become an important issue in software and
hardware veriﬁcation, which can be seen as special cases of
proof veriﬁcation [18, 19]. Just like a large portion of published mathematical proofs, software is known to contain
massive amounts of bugs [71], perhaps as many as ﬁfty per
thousand lines of code2, but maybe as few as 2.3 [72].
Similarly, just like with mathematical proofs, the issue of
inﬁnite regress of veriﬁers is making software only probabilistically veriﬁable. For example, Fetzer writes: ‘There are
no special difﬁculties so long as [higher-level machines’]
intended interpretations are abstract machines. When their
intended interpretations are target machines, then we
encounter the problem of determining the reliability of the
verifying programs themselves (‘How do we verify the veriﬁers?’), which invites a regress of relative veriﬁcations’ [73].
This notion of unveriﬁability of software has been a part
of the ﬁeld since its early days. Smith writes: ‘For fundamental reasons—reasons that anyone can understand—there
are inherent limitations to what can be proven about computers and computer programs. K Just because a program is
‘proven correct’ K, you cannot be sure that it will do what
you intend’ [74]. Rodd agrees and says: ‘Indeed, although it is
now almost trite to say it, since the comprehensive testing of
software is impossible, only very vague estimates of any
program’s reliability seem ever to be possible’ [75]. Currently, most software is released without any attempt to formally verify it in the ﬁrst place.
5.1. Unverifiability of AI

One particular type of software, known as AI (and even more
so superintelligence), differs from other programs by its
ability to learn new behaviors, adjust its performance, and act
semi-autonomously in novel situations. Given the potential
impact from intelligent software, it is not surprising that the
ability to verify future intelligent behavior is one of the grand
challenges of modern AI research [24, 76–78].
It has been observed that science frequently discovers so
called ‘conjugate (complementary) pairs’, ‘a couple of
requirements, each of them being satisﬁed only at the expense
of the other K. It is known as the Principle of Complementarity in physics. Famous prototypes of conjugate pairs
are (position, momentum) discovered by Heisenberg in
quantum mechanics and (consistency, completeness) discovered by Gödel in logic. But similar warnings come from
other directions. According to Einstein K, ‘in so far as the
propositions of mathematics are certain, they do not refer to
reality, and in so far as they refer to reality, they are not
certain’, hence (certainty, reality) is a conjugate pair’ [56].
Similarly, in proofs we are ‘[t]aking rigour as something that
can be acquired only at the expense of meaning and
2
http://theengineer.co.uk/issues/may-2013-online/veriﬁcation-systemaims-to-guarantee-software-function/.
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in its results. With the recent reproducibility crisis [104, 105]
in multiple ﬁelds of science [106–109] our results are very
timely and should allow for a better understanding of limits to
veriﬁability and resources required to get desired levels of
conﬁdence in the results.

6. Implications for physics and science in general
From Ancient Greece to modern times the idea that a fundamental relationship exists between mathematics and physics has persisted, with multiple claims that our universe is
‘written’ in the language of mathematics [86–89]. Most
famously, in 1960, Wigner published his seminal paper
wondering about reasons for ‘the unreasonable effectiveness
of mathematics in natural sciences’ [90]. Tegmark, in his
mathematical universe hypothesis (MUH), suggested that the
answer is that ‘our external physical reality is a mathematical
structure’ [91–93]. Since the publication of the MUH a signiﬁcant amount of evidence has been published linking fundamental theory of nature (Quantum Physics) with different
mathematical structures, including many recent discoveries
[94–96].
In this paper, we argue that all mathematical proofs are
inherently probabilistic and by extension so is all of mathematics. Therefore, unveriﬁability—one of the ultimate limits
to computational techniques can be considered as another
piece of evidence in favor of the MUH. In Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics wavefunction description is probabilistic. The Born rule [97], a fundamental
component of Copenhagen interpretation, provides a link
between mathematics and experimental observations. More
speciﬁcally, the Born rule predicts the probability of observing a particle at a given location as proportionate to the
square of the magnitude of the wavefunction at that coordinate. Observations in quantum physics, just like in mathematics, are probabilistic [98] and by extension so is all of
physics. Using a different interpretation of quantum physics,
for example many-worlds interpretation [99] which is more
consistent with the MUH, leads to similar conclusions
regarding veriﬁability [100].
Interestingly, Wigner himself in the same paper hints at
mathematical unveriﬁability: ‘Similarly, it is possible that the
theories, which we consider to be ‘proved’ by a number of
numerical agreements which appears to be large enough for
us, are false because they are in conﬂict with a possible more
encompassing theory which is beyond our means of discovery’ [90]. More generally, cosmology and unveriﬁability
are intimately linked meaning ‘we are unable to obtain a
model of the Universe without some speciﬁcally cosmological assumptions which are completely unveriﬁable’ [101]. In
case of theories such as many-worlds, the multiverse by
deﬁnition is unobservable by the same observer or multiple
observers able to communicate and so is experimentally
unveriﬁable.
We have constructed our argument for unveriﬁability
based on an inﬁnite regress of veriﬁers after reasoning that
veriﬁers are a mathematical equivalent of observers in physics. Inﬁnite regress of observers is a fundamental part of
physics, as exempliﬁed by Wigner’s friend [102] thought
experiment, as well as a fundamental matter of reproducibility
of scientiﬁc experiments [103], in which scientists are the
observers. A particular experiment could be repeated many
times always increasing our conﬁdence in the results, but just
like with proof veriﬁcation, never giving us a 100% certainty

7. Conclusions and future work
Our preliminary work suggests that the ‘veriﬁer’ be investigated as a new mathematical object of interest for future
study and opens the door for an improved understanding of
the topic. For example, an artiﬁcially intelligent veriﬁer
could be used to re-check all previously published mathematical proofs, greatly increasing correctness of all proofs.
Problems such as inﬁnite regress of veriﬁers may be
unsolvable, but methods such as probabilistic veriﬁcation
should be capable of giving us as much assurance as we are
willing to pay for. Any progress in the proposed ‘veriﬁer
theory’ will have additional beneﬁts beyond its contribution
to mathematics by making it possible to design safer
advanced AI, a topic that is predicted to become one of the
greatest problems in science in the upcoming decades
[110, 111]. A veriﬁer is a hidden component of any proof;
we can improve our capacity to verify by explicitly
describing the required veriﬁcation agent.
It would be valuable to learn what types of physical or
informational systems can act as veriﬁers and what their
essential properties are. We should explore how selection of
the type of the veriﬁer inﬂuences mathematics as a ﬁeld and
speciﬁcally what categories of theorems we can prove and
which we cannot prove with respect to different veriﬁers.
Are there still undiscovered types of mathematical veriﬁers?
Does a group of veriﬁers have greater power than the sum
of its component modules? How can veriﬁers perform best
while operating with limited computational resources?
What is the formal relationship between the set of all
veriﬁers and the set of all observers? Can a veriﬁer be
hacked and can the attack be contained in the proof it is
examining? Can all these questions be reduced to a broader
question on the nature of different possible types of intelligences [112]?
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